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CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: A
CORPORATE GUIDE TO AVOIDING LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the discovery of severe environ-
mental damage caused by unregulated waste has become a wide-
spread concern in America.' Today's society, faced with
tremendous environmental deterioration, is calling for a strong-
arm approach to polluters.2 Congress addressed this public con-
cern by enacting tough environmental legislation and turning cor-
porate offenders into public enemy number one.3 The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) no longer merely
fines corporations for environmental violations; it now criminally
prosecutes employees of corporate violators.4 Nearly every environ-
mental statute enacted since the dawn of the environmental move-
ment initially contained, or has been amended to include, a
criminal enforcement section. 5 These enforcement mechanisms
1. See Kenneth A. Hodson et al., The Prosecution of Corporations and Corporate
Officers for Environmental Crimes: Limiting One's Exposure for Environmental Criminal
Liability, 34 Amuz. L. REv. 553 (1992).
2. ENVIRONMENT OPINION STUDY, INC., A SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS: ATTi-
TUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT 14 (1990). Over 70% of Americans favor incar-
ceration "when companies are found guilty of deliberately violating pollution
laws." Id. This 1990 telephone survey of 1004 United States households posed the
following question:
Right now a company is usually fined if it violates state or federal pollu-
tion levels, but rarely has anyone gone to prison. Now, would you favor
or oppose changing the law so that when companies are found guilty of
deliberately violating pollution laws, the officials responsible could be
sentenced to jail terms?
Id. The results indicated that 72% of those surveyed supported prison terms, while
only 24% were opposed. Id.
3. See Robert Abrams, The Maturing Discipline of Environmental Prosecution, 16
COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 279, 280-81 (1991) (discussing reciprocal relationship between
changes in society's recognition of dire need to protect environment and signifi-
cant increase in federal legislation).
4. See Paul G. Nittoly, Environmental Criminal Cases: The Dawn of a New Era 21
SETON HALL L. REv. 1125 (1991) (discussing growing trend of courts to enforce
environmental laws and punish corporate offenders). For specific statistics of cor-
porate indictments and resulting prison time, see infra note 12.
5. See Hodson, supra note 1, at 555-59. For a discussion of environmental stat-
utes which contain criminal enforcement provisions, see infra notes 29-53 and ac-
companying text.
(205)
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prove to be powerful tools for punishing corporate offenders. 6 As
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines demonstrate, 7 environmental vi-
olators receive strict punishment for their crimes.8 Congress en-
acted these measures to send a wake-up call to corporations and
their officers throughout the United States. 9
In today's environmentally conscious world,' 0 all corporate of-
ficials, including processors, transporters and receivers of toxic
waste, must be equally aware of the dangers of non-compliance with
6. Keith A. Onsdorff&James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doc-
trine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 ENVTL. L.
RFP. 10,099 (Feb. 1992). The authors explain, "[tihe Justice Department has
sought to use the responsible corporate officer doctrine in an attempt to circum-
vent RCRA's slender knowledge requirement and to enforce this public health
statute as if it imposed vicarious criminal liability upon CEOs for the crimes of
corporate subordinates." Id. at 10,102.
7. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1995) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2Q (1996)). The Guidelines are specifically geared toward punishing
environmental violators because the United States Sentencing Commission was
"aware that Congress had expressed views in favor of tougher penalties for white-
collar offenses ... Environmental offenses can, and quite often do, pose a threat to
society that far outweighs their number." Judge William A. Wilkins, Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Address at the National Conference on Local and
State Enforcement of the Environmental Laws (Mar. 30, 1989).
The United States Sentencing Commission is an eight-member panel estab-
lished by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98
(1988). In 1987, the Commission published the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The two primary goals of the Guidelines are: (1) "ensur[ing] proportionality in
sentencing among defendants found guilty of similar conduct;" and (2)
"remov[ing] the uncertainty that previously characterized the sentencing process."
Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing
Guidelines: The Time Has Cam... and It Is Hard Time, 20 ENv-rL. L. REP. 10,096,
10,097 (Mar. 1990). Furthermore, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989),
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the act creating the Sentencing
Commission and the Guidelines. Id. at 412.
8. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1995) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2Q (1996)). "The Guidelines divide environmental offenses into four
categories: (1) [klnowing endangerment of human life; (2) [olffenses involving
hazardous or toxic substances; (3) [o]ffenses involving other pollutants; and (4)
[o]ffenses against conservation and wildlife." Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord,
Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 781, 798 (1991).
9. Starr & Kelly, supra note 7, at 10,104. The wake-up call means, "one does
not have to be bad to do bad when it comes to environmental crimes. The 'black
heart' requirement commonly associated with other criminal activity is not neces-
sary to sustain a conviction." Id. (emphasis in original).
10. Although this Comment deals specifically with EPA's attack on corporate
America, EPA has also expanded its attack globally. See F. James Handley, Hazard-
ous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International Legal Controls, 19 ENrWL. L.
REP. 10,171 (Apr. 1989). A growing problem worldwide is the illegal export and
import of hazardous waste. Id. Many companies are tempted to transport waste to
countries where environmental laws are less stringent and enforcement less sophis-
ticated. Id. Obviously, since exporting waste to these countries is less expensive,
higher profits are realized. Robert E. Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View From the
Developed World, 20 N.Y.U. J. IrN'L L. & POL. 629 (1988).
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environmental regulations and the availability of criminal enforce-
ment for violations. 1 Any corporation faced with environmental
concerns is on notice that the EPA watchdog has exchanged the
pestering bark of civil fines with the resounding bite of prison
time. 12 Gone are the days when a company could simply buy prop-
erty, take over a building, or conduct its everyday business affairs
11. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times atJustice and EPA: The Origins of Environ-
mental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 900
(1991). "[TIhe threat of incarceration undoubtedly deters other corporate offi-
cials from engaging in or countenancing similar misconduct and causes them to
become more compliance-conscious." Id. at 901.
12. James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s,
59 GEo. WAsH. L. Ra.v. 916 (1991). "Environmental crime does not pay! This is
the message of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the
1990s . . .Today there is no question that criminal enforcement is EPA's most
effective deterrent." Id.
In fact, since the beginning of 1983 until December 13, 1995, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has recorded environmental criminal indictments against 1,674
corporate and individual defendants and 1,176 guilty pleas and convictions. Re-
corded as of September 29, 1995, nearly $309 million in criminal penalties were
assessed (this number includes federal and state restitutions and known costs for
remediation) and 517 years of imprisonment imposed (374 of which account for
actual confinement).
Of the 1,674 defendants indicted, 495 were corporations or organizations and
the remaining 1,179 were individuals. Of the 1,176 convictions, 365 were against
organizations, and the remaining 809 were against individuals.
Year Indictments Pleas/Convictions
FY83 40 40
FY84 43 32
FY85 40 37
FY86 94 67
FY87 127 86
FY88 124 63
FY89 101 107
FY90 134 85
FY91 127 96
FY92 187 104
FY93 218 176
FY94 182 129
FY95 257 154
TOTAL
1997] 207
1674 1176
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without concern for the environment. 13 Presently, a company must
fully inform its employees that EPA, when prosecuting violations,
will pursue stiffjail sentences for employees connected with the vio-
lation.14 Furthermore, courts have enforced EPA's new-found em-
phasis on criminal sanctions, 15 making it abundantly clear that a
Note: The following prison calculations are current according to data entered as
of September 29, 1995. More dispositions are expected.
Penalties Prison Terms Actual
Imposed Imposed Confinement
[Including [Excluding
Federal, State suspended
and Local] portions]
FY83 $ 341,100 11 yrs. 5 yrs.
FY84 384,290 5 yrs. 3 mos. 1 yr. 7 mos.
FY85 565,290 5 yrs. 5 mos. 2 yrs. 11 mos.
FY86 1,917,602 64 yrs. 2 mos. 31 yrs. 4 mos.
FY87 3,046,060 32 yrs. 4 mos. 14 yrs. 9 mos.
FY88 7,091,876 39 yrs. 3 mos. 8 yrs. 3 mos.
FY89 12,750,330 51 yrs. 25 mos. 36 yrs. 14 mos.
FY90 *29,977,508 71 yrs. 11 mos. 47 yrs. 13 mos.
FY91 18,508,732 24 yrs. 8 mos. 22 yrs. 8 mos.
FY92 **169,359,344 37 yrs. 6 mos. 34 yrs. 1 mo.
FY93 18,992,968 62 yrs. 8 mos. 55 yrs. 4 mos.
FY94 27,714,286 69 yrs. 7 mos. 69 yrs. 7 mos.
FY95 18,996,735 43 yrs. 1 mo. 43 yrs. 1 mo.
TOTAL $ 308,990,584 513 yrs. 53 mos. 367 yrs. 10 mos.
* FY90: This total includes a $22 million forfeiture that was obtained in a RICO/mail
fraud case against three individuals and six related waste disposal and real estate develop-
ment companies. A major portion of this forfeiture was designated for hazardous waste
cleanup upon liquidation of assets. Included in the terms of imprisonment are two 12
year/7 month sentences against two of the individuals in the same case.
** FY92: This total includes $125 million in criminal assessments against Exxon Corp. and
Exxon Shipping Co. for the Valdez oil spill. Half of the original $250 million criminal
sentence was remitted for pledges by Exxon to expenditures far exceeding this amount
on environmental safety projects, a contribution to a response fund for large-scale oil
spills, and committing 25% of its total research expenditure on environmental and safety
research. Fourty-four million dollars in penalties [were] assessed at federal sentences in
FY92 besides the $125 million Exxon assessment.
Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, Paralegal to Ronald A. Sarachan, Chief, Envi-
ronmental Crimes Section (Mar. 19, 1996) (on file with authors).
13. See Starr & Kelly, supra note 7, at 10,097 (positing that "[n]o longer can
one charged with environmental wrongdoing take refuge in relatively light
sentences typically imposed for environmental violations").
14. See Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer:
Designated Felon or Legal Fiction , 25 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 169 (1994) (fleshing out EPA's
enforcement policy against corporate personnel and framework of "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine). The authors point out that individual employees
comprised nearly 80% of those prosecuted for environmental claims between 1983
and 1989. Id. at 169. With the significant increase in personal culpability, it is
imperative that employees are made aware of the law. See id.
15. Starr & Kelly, supra note 7, at 10,096. The Sentencing Guidelines have
mandated that judges strictly enforce environmental crimes. Id.
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modem business person must adapt to a new corporate
environment.16
The purpose of criminal enforcement is to shatter corpora-
tions' belief that civil fines are merely a license to pollute or a busi-
ness cost that can be passed on to the consumer. 17 Indeed,
according to Joseph Block, Chief of the Environmental Crimes Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), "[i]ncarceration is the
one cost of business that you can't pass to the consumer."18 Fur-
thermore, some commentators believe that Chief Executive Of-
ficers (CEOs) view civil fines as nothing more than a nuisance; and
thus, monetary penalties have little effect on the corporate mind-
set.19 Peter Beeson, a former DOJ employee, explained the impact
of criminal prosecutions on executives: "[p]rosecution may be
more effective for crime in the suites than it is for crime in the
16. See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmen-
tal Crimes, 21 ST. MARV's L.J. 821 (1990) (discussing harsh reality of actual incarcer-
ation for EPA violations).
17. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-
190, §§ 101-207, 83 Stat. 852 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994)).
These new criminal sanctions are in accordance with EPA's long term goal of rem-
edying and protecting the environment. Id. EPA's policy is clearly delineated in
Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act. NEPA obligates the federal gov-
ernment to:
[cooperate] with State and local governments, and other concerned pub-
lic and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures ... to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans.
Id. (emphasis added). The government's duties and NEPA's ends are enumerated
as follows:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the envi-
ronment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically
[sic] and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unin-
tended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which
supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will
permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maxi-
mum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).
18. Joseph Block, Chief of Environmental Crimes Division of DOJ, An Ad-
dress to the Office of Legal Education, Environmental Law Conference (Oct. 11-
13, 1989).
19. See William F. Jung, Recognizing a Corporations' Rights Under the Indictment
Clause, 1983 UNIV. ILL. L. REv. 477, 496 (1983).
1997]
5
Bellew and Surtz: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A Corporate Guide to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
210 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 205
streets: '[d]eterrence works best on people who have not had con-
tact with criminal justice and for whom prosecution or even investi-
gation will have severe personal consequences."' 20
Although the rise of criminal prosecutions for environmental
offenses is a concern for corporate employees, a fairly easy and
practical solution exists.2 ' The purpose of this Comment is to alert
the corporate world to the seriousness of criminal prosecution for
violations of environmental laws and to provide a guide on how to
avoid such liability.22 Specifically, this Comment focuses on simple
compliance, disclosure, education and integrity.23
Part II of this Comment presents a background of the legisla-
tion enacted to protect the environment and a discussion of Con-
gress's intent to use fines and incarceration as strong deterrents for
environmental violations. 24 Part III discusses corporate and individ-
ual liability and the judicial trend throughout the United States to
strictly adhere to the letter of the law.25 Finally, this Comment pro-
vides a checklist for corporations to follow in order to avoid crimi-
nal liability.2
6
II. TOUGH EPA LEGISLATION
A. Congress Gives Corporate America a Wake-Up Call
Before Congress decided to place the responsibility of cleaning
up and protecting the environment on corporations, a corporate
20. Joseph F. DiMento, Environmental Law and American Business: Dilemmas of
Compliance, 42-43 (1986) (quoting William Greider, Fines Aren't Enough: Send Copo-
rate Polluters to Jail, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 29, 1984, at 10).
21. For a discussion of a corporate guide to avoiding corporate liability, see
infra notes 134-64 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of criminal liability for environmental crimes, see infra
notes 63-85 and accompanying text. For a checklist on how to avoid corporate
liability, see infra notes 134-64 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of practical considerations to avoiding criminal liability,
see infra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
24. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the criminal enforce-
ment provisions of environmental legislation, see infra notes 28-53 and accompany-
ing text. For DOJ statistics on corporate criminal prosecutions for environmental
crimes, see supra note 12.
25. For a discussion of the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine (RCO doc-
trine), see infra notes 54-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the RCO
doctrine and the Clean Water Act, see infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of corporate liability under Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, see infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the RCO
doctrine and the Clean Air Act, see infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of EPA's new self-policing policy and a guide to avoiding
criminal liability for environmental violations, see infra notes 134-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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CEO never had to worry about going to prison for polluting the
environment.2 7 This "business as usual" outlook abruptly changed
when Congress effectuated its desire to have corporate America
spearhead the environmental movement by enacting comprehen-
sive environmental schemes that give EPA the power to pursue, not
only civil, but criminal punishment for pollution. 28
Three statutes illustrate Congress's growing emphasis on crimi-
nal punishment for environmental infractions. The Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),2 renowned for its
high financial penalties, is the most expansive of the environmental
statutes.30 The other two statutes, the Clean Water Act of 1977
(CWA)31 and the Clean Air Act of 1967 (CAA),32 laid the ground-
work for modern environmental laws by placing emphasis on finan-
cial sanctions for violators.33 Generally, these laws are enforced
through monetary penalties which serve the dual purpose of pun-
ishing offenders and financing cleanup operations.3 4 Dissatisfied
with the result garnered by the imposition of solely monetary penal-
ties, EPA turned to criminal prosecution of corporate offenders.3 5
27. See G. Nelson Smith, III, No Longer Just a Cost of Doing Business: Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officials for Violations of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 53 LA. L. REV. 119 (1992) (detailing past corporate apa-
thy of environmental enforcement and new, stringent prosecution laws).
28. See generally Truxtun Hare, Reluctant Soldiers: The Criminal Liability of Corpo-
rate Officers for Negligent Violations of the Clean Water Act, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 935, 938
(1990) (exploring criminal penalties against unsuspecting corporate officers).
29. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 10002-11012, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1994).
30. For a discussion of corporate criminal liability under RCRA, see infra
notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
31. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) §§ 101-606, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
32. Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 77 Stat. 392 (1967)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
33. For a discussion of criminal prosecution under the CWA and the CAA, see
infra notes 86-105 and 122-33 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Shahrzad Heyat et al., Environmental Crimes, 31 AM. ClUM. L. Rlv.
475 (1994) (discussing EPA's move toward criminal enforcement of environmental
crimes).
35. Strock, supra note 12, at 916. Strock writes, "[d]uring the first ten years of
the EPA's history, industries all too often regarded civil and administrative penal-
ties for violations of environmental laws all as a cost of doing business. The addi-
tion of criminal sanctions to environmental laws was therefore necessary to build
an effective enforcement program." Id.
1997] 211
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B. Statutory Departure: From Civil Fines to Prison Time
1. Criminal Sanctions Under RCRA
RCRA was passed in response to the growing waste disposal
problems throughout the country.3 6 At its inception, RCRA con-
tained provisions allowing for criminal sanctions;37 however, for sev-
36. Id. Congress decided to add criminal provisions to help EPA combat the
tremendous environmental challenge. Id. The statute goes into great detail in
describing these criminal penalties. SeeRCRA § 3008(d), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d),
(e). The statute provides in pertinent part:
[a]ny person who-
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subtitle [RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921] to a
facility which does not have a permit under this subchapter [RCRA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921] ... or pursuant to Title I of the Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act (86 Stat. 1052) [33 U.S.C. §§ 1411 et seq.]
... shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000
for each day of violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years... If
the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment under the re-
spective paragraph shall be doubled with respect to both fine and
imprisonment.
Id. § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). The statute also contains a "Knowing Endan-
germent" section which states:
[a]ny person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or ex-
ports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter or
used oil not identified or listed as a hazardous waste under this sub-
chapter [RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928] ... shall, upon conviction, be subject
to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than
fifteen years, or both. A defendant that is an organization shall, upon
conviction of violating this subsection, be subject to a fine of not more
than $1,000,000.
Id. § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
37. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238. From the beginning, the bill's legislative purpose was to rem-
edy the growing problems associated with the three to four billion tons of solid
waste that are generated by our country each year. Id. As proposed, this was to be
accomplished through implementation of management plans and facilities to as-
sist in recovering resources from discarded material. Id. The House Report ex-
presses the bill's intention in the following few sentences:
The problems associated with discarded materials which prompted
the committee to enter an area which has been traditionally considered
the sphere of local responsibility are greater than just the increasing vol-
ume of the discarded materials. Yet a few words on volume are in order.
Over the last few years the amount of discarded materials to be dis-
posed of has grown to approximately 4 billion tons per year. An annual
increase of 8 percent is anticipated through the next decade. The most
widespread method of disposal is to landfill the discarded materials.
However, land has become a scarce resource in the nation's metropolitan
areas. Many of our major cities will be out of landfill capacity within 5
years. Some are already seeking disposal sites outside their corporate
limits.
Some states have moved to ban the importation of wastes as have
their political subdivisions. These actions have raised serious questions
relative to restraint of trade and interference with interstate commerce.
8
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eral years after RCRA's approval, EPA gave no indication that it
intended to enforce the statute's criminal provisions on corporate
individuals. 38 This reluctance to impose criminal sanctions sud-
denly changed with the enactment of the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984.39 The tremendous financial resources
and enforcement direction stemming from the act prompted EPA
The Committee is also concerned with the consumption of this na-
tion's domestic raw materials and the potential for future material
shortages. Already an increasing portion of our balance of trade deficit is
caused by the need to import raw materials. Are there ways to reclaim for
reuse those resources now disposed of and thereby reduce the need for
virgin raw materials?
The overriding concern of the Committee however, is the effect on
the population and the environment of the disposal of discarded hazard-
ous wastes- those which by virtue of their composition or longevity are
harmful, toxic, or lethal.
Id. at 6240-41.
Generally, Congress believed that its purpose could be effectuated. Legisla-
tive history outlines this primary enforcement method. See generaUy id. at 6297 (dis-
cussing federal enforcement through strict fines). Nevertheless, the following
statement shows Congress did not totally rely on civil enforcement:
[e]nforcement under this section is accomplished by a variety of provi-
sions: inspections by authorized federal or state inspectors, compliance
orders issued by the Administrator and enforced in court, and civil and
criminal penalties.
This array of enforcement mechanisms is so that punishment is re-
lated to the offense. Many times civil penalties are more appropriate and
more effective than criminal. However, many times when there is a will-
ful violation of a statute which seriously harms human health, criminal
penalties may be appropriate.
Id. at 6268. This language indicates that Congress placed criminal penalties in the
statute as a last resort.
38. See Smith, supra note 27, at 140-41. It is important to note that RCRA has
been amended extensively since its inception. Id. The most important of these
amendments was entitled the Comprehensive Environmental Resource, Conserva-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. CERCIA §§ 101-405, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9600-75 (1994)).
Initially, CERCLA contained provisions that allowed EPA to enforce its purported
purpose through the use of criminal sanctions. Id. § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
In its early years, these provisions were rarely used. Smith, supra note 27, at 141.
Likewise, when the Superfund Amendments were added to the Act in 1986, these
criminal sanctions remained an inconspicuous aspect of the drive to cleanup haz-
ardous waste. Strock, supra note 12, at 925. Although these provisions appeared in
the 1980 Act and were further strengthened in the 1986 Amendments, corporate
America was given no indication that EPA would go on an environmental vendetta
and begin holding corporate management, supervisors and employees criminally
liable for environmental transgressions. Id. at 925-26.
39. See RCRA § 3001(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (specifically providing for crimi-
nal penalties under RCRA).
1997] 213
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to demand strict compliance.40 Suddenly, corporations all over
America became prime targets for EPA's new-found enthusiasm.41
2. Criminal Sanctions Under CWA
Congress passed the CWA in 1948 to prevent and control water
pollution.42 Although the original bill contained criminal provi-
40. H.R. REP. No. 98-616, at 18 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576.
The bill not only authorized almost $500 million for environmental enforcement
over a three-year span but also gave EPA great latitude in trying cases and con-
ducting criminal investigations. Id.
The amendments added an entirely new section allowing EPA to try suits in
which the DOJ had not promptly acted. See Margaret K. Minister, Federal Facilities
and the Deterrence of Environmental Laws: The Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal
Employees, 18 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 137, 155 (1994). Ordinarily, EPA would refer
the case to the DOJ, who would then proceed with the litigation. Id. Under this
new section, EPA could bring an action themselves if the DOJ did not act quickly
on these referrals. Id. The procedures state:
[o] nce a referral has been made by Administrator, the Attorney General
is expected to act promptly to initiate a civil litigation. If he does not
inform the Administrator that he will commence the litigation and repre-
sent the agency within 30 days after the referral is transmitted to the Jus-
tice Department, and if he does not file the action within 150 days after
the referral, the Administrator then has "exclusive authority" to decide to
commence the action and to represent himself in the federal district and
appeals court.
H.R. REP. No. 98-616, at 49, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5608.
Through the amendments, Congress gave EPA the power to conduct criminal
investigations which EPA had never before initiated. The pertinent excerpt of the
House Report states:
[t] he Committee has also determined that in order for EPA to adequately
fulfill its law enforcement functions under RCRA, its criminal investiga-
tors must be granted authority to carry firearms; execute and serve war-
rants, summons and subpoenas; administer oaths, make arrests without a
warrant for offenses against the United States committed in their pres-
ence and for felonies if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing such a felony.
Id. at 5611.
41. See Hodson, supra note 1, at 554.
42. CWA §§ 101-606, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). See Hodson, supra note
1, at 555 (discussing circumstances under which corporations or their officers can
be held liable for environmental crimes).
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sions, 43 until recently they were not utilized."4 Currently, EPA has
exhibited a "sobering trend" and now enforces the CWA, through
strict criminal penalties, against corporate violators.45 In fact, EPA
has even imposed penalties in situations where the violators did not
specifically intend to violate the CWA.4
43. See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Section 1319 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who willfully or negligently violates section 1311, 1312,
1317, or 1318 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation imple-
menting any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
title by the Administrator or by a State or in a permit issued under section
1344 of this title by a State, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one
year or both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after the first
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a
fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
for not more than two years, or both.
(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, representa-
tion, or certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other
document or filed or required to be maintained under this chapter or
who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any monitor-
ing device or method required to be maintained by this chapter, shall
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.
(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "person" shall mean, in
addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any
responsible corporate officers.
Id. at § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
44. See Hodson, supra note 1, at 555-56. The authors state:
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or "Clean
Water Act" (CWA) as it was commonly known, in 1948. It contains a com-
prehensive system designed to prevent and control water pollution.
Among other things, the CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants into
the surface water. Statutes and regulations set forth performance stan-
dards. The CWA is enforced through civil, criminal, and administrative
penalties.
The CWA includes criminal penalties for knowing and negligent vio-
lations, as well as knowing endangerment, and false statements. In addi-
tion, under the CWA liability attaches directly to a "responsible corporate
officer." Penalties for individuals range from fines of $2,500 and prison
terms of not more than a year for negligent violations, to $250,000 fines
and fifteen-year prison terms for knowing endangerment. Corporations
can be fined up to one million dollars for violating the CWA knowing
endangerment provisions. A "person" subject to CWA criminal penalties
includes a "responsible corporate officer."
Id.
45. Id. See generally United States v. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa.
1982), affd, 707 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983) (exempli-
fying EPA's strict prosecutorial policy when defendants willfully or negligently vio-
late Clean Water Act).
46. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. at 715. Hodson posits: "[tihe cases show a sober-
ing trend toward strict criminal penalties for even minor violations of the CWA.
One of the early cases brought under the CWA held that a defendant need not
specifically intend to violate the CWA for conviction." Hodson, supra note 1, at
556 (discussing Frezzo Bros. case).
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3. Criminal Sanctions Under CAA
The CAA was amended in 197747 for the sole purpose of sub-
jecting corporate officers to misdemeanor sanctions.48 However, in
practice, EPA and the courts rarely used the sanctions for punish-
ment.49 In 1990, Congress added felony sanctions to the CAA, "re-
quiring the imposition of substantial periods of incarceration" for
persons lacking actual knowledge of the violation. 50 In recent
years, the number of felony charges brought against corporate of-
ficers has increased by an alarming number. 51
As evidenced by the growing case law in this area, EPA is dedi-
cated to continuing criminal enforcement under RCRA, the CWA,
and the CAA.52 Understanding the means by which EPA employs
these criminal provisions is a corporation's best defense against
criminal prosecution. 53 The following explanations and recom-
mendations will educate corporations and prepare them for attacks
by the zealous EPA.
47. See CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994). Under the heading "Criminal
Penalties" the statute reads:
(1) [a] ny person who knowingly violates any requirement or prohibition
of an applicable implementation plan (during any period of federally as-
sumed enforcement or more than 30 days after having been notified
under subsection (a) (1) of this section by the Administrator that such
person is violating such requirement or prohibition), any order under
subsection (a) of this section ... shall, upon conviction, be punished by a
fine pursuant to Title 18, or by imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or
both. If a conviction of any person under this paragraph is for a violation
committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph,
the maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both the fine
and imprisonment.
Id. § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c).
48. Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. DeMonaco, The Present Use of the Responsi-
ble Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 23
ENvTL. L. REP. 10,145, 10,148 (Mar. 1993). "The 1977 amendments to the CAA
made it abundantly clear that Congress intended the responsible corporate officer
to be subject to criminal penalties." Id. The legislative history of the CAA reads in
part: [fior the purpose of liability for criminal penalties the term "person" is
defined to include any responsible corporate officer. This is based on a
similar definition in the enforcement of the [CAA]. The Committee in-
tends that criminal penalties be sought against those corporate officers
under whose responsibility a violation has taken place, and not just those
employees directly involved in the operation of violating source.
S. REP. No. 94-717, at 40 (1976), reprinted in 6 A LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF THE CLE-AN
AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1977, No. 95-16, 470, 474 (1978).
49. Hartman & DeMonaco, supra note 48, at 10,148.
50. Id. See CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
51. For specific statistics regarding felony charges, see supra note 12.
52. See Hartman & DeMonaco, supra note 48, at 10,145.
53. For a discussion of EPA's compliance guidelines, see infra notes 134-64
and accompanying text.
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III. CORPORATE LIABILITY
The first question a CEO is apt to ask is "How do they get to
me?" Unfortunately for the CEO, the corporate veil is pierced
quite easily in criminal prosecutions for environmental crimes. 54
While many commentators argue that such liability violates basic
constitutional rights, 55 case law indicates that courts have not ad-
judged criminal prosecution as being unconstitutional. 56 CEOs,
therefore, may no longer hide behind a desk to avoid criminal
liability.
The government utilizes uniform measures when prosecuting
corporations and their management for environmental crimes.57
Usually, the DOJ, in coordination with EPA, utilizes the Responsi-
ble Corporate Officer doctrine (RCO doctrine) in the prosecution
of environmental crimes.58 Under the RCO doctrine, a corpora-
tion and its officers are held strictly liable for any environmental
violation caused by an employee of that corporation.59 Simply
stated, the government uses the doctrine of respondeat superior to
link corporate management to environmental violations.60 Under
this theory, CEOs and other corporate officers should be aware of
the very real possibility that courts, using the RCO doctrine, will
ignore the mens rea component of a criminal prosecution in cases
that indicate "willful blindness" on the part of CEOs and other cor-
porate officers, or other circumstantial evidence demonstrating
that the corporation permitted the violation.6' Thus, a CEO could
be convicted solely on the basis of the corporate position held by
the individual.62
54. Se Jay C. Magnuson & Garrett C. Levit, Policy Considerations in Corporate
Criminal Prosecutions after People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 62 N.D. L. REv. 913, 922
(1987).
55. Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,102-03.
56. For a discussion of the trend of courts across the United States to strictly
punish environmental violations, see infra notes 86-133 and accompanying text.
57. See Arnold S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcenent of Environmental Laws, 75
MAss. L. Rv. 112 (1990) (discussing need for uniformity in enforcing EPA
guidelines).
58. For a definition and discussion of the RCO doctrine, see infra notes 59-85
and accompanying text.
59. Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,102.
60. Id.
61. For a further discussion of corporate liability and circumstantial evidence
under the RCO doctrine, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text, infra notes
62-85 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Lisa Ann Harig, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers
Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DuKE LJ.
145 (1992).
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A. The RCO Doctrine
The RCO doctrine is a useful tool in EPA's campaign against
corporate violators. 63 The doctrine circumvents the knowledge re-
quirement of environmental statutes by imposing vicarious criminal
liability upon CEOs for the environmental violations of their subor-
dinates.64 Although this approach seems to be a violation of the
constitutional right to due process, the apparent need to remedy
environmental pollution appears to outweigh the constitutional
rights of corporations and their officers.65 Most courts continue to
require some level of knowledge of wrongdoing in order to secure a
conviction under the criminal provisions of the various environ-
mental schemes, but the threshold is extremely low. 66 In fact,
courts will sustain convictions where the evidence only circumstan-
tially demonstrates that a corporate officer knew of a violation or
deliberately avoided such knowledge.67
The development of the RCO doctrine began with the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dotterweich.68 Dot-
63. Oliver Wendell Holmes best summarized the rationale behind the RCO
doctrine when he wrote:
[i]f I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have
hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was
inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to
sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier
dying for your country if you like.
1 HoLMEs-LAsvi LiErrs 806 (Mark Howe ed. 1953).
64. Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,102. The core of this article deals
with the reality of a fading mens rea requirement for environmental criminal liabil-
ity. The editors summarize the article, stating:
EPA and the Department of Justice are aggressively enforcing the crimi-
nal provisions of federal environmental laws. Companies and their of-
ficers are subject to large fines and jail terms if convicted. Corporate
officers should be aware of a recent trend in RCRA criminal enforcement
in which the Justice Department has attempted to hold corporate officers
and chief executive officers criminally liable for the actions of their sub-
ordinates, even when the officers did not have actual knowledge of their
employees' illegal conduct. The Justice Department has attempted to
apply a theory known as the responsible corporate officer doctrine to
override the knowledge requirements in RCRA's criminal liability provi-
sion... [A] Ithough the Justice Department has not been outwardly suc-
cessful in advancing this approach, it may have shifted the burden of
proof in RCRA cases.
Id. at 10,099.
65. Id. at 10,103-05 (discussing constitutional issues surrounding mens rea re-
quirement in criminal prosecution under RCRA).
66. For an explication of cases discussing the level of knowledge required for
conviction under the criminal provisions of CAA, RCRA and CWA, see infra notes
86-133 and accompanying text.
67. Hartman & DeMonaco, supra note 48, at 10,151-53 (reviewing circuit
court cases embracing RCO doctrine).
68. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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terweich, as president of the Buffalo Pharmaceutical Company, was
convicted of three misdemeanor violations under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 69 for shipping misbranded and
adulterated drugs in interstate commerce. 70 The Supreme Court
held that the FDCA "dispenses with the conventional requirement
for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing."71  The
Court stated that, "[i] n the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."72 Thus, corpo-
rate officers who have a "responsible share in the furtherance of the
transaction which the statute outlaws" will be held liable for viola-
tions of these statutes.73
The RCO doctrine was further articulated in United States v.
Park.74 In Park, the president of ACME Markets, Inc. was prose-
cuted after the company held food, shipped through interstate
commerce, in a building exposed to rodent contamination. 75 The
Park decision clarified the RCO doctrine, imposing two primary du-
ties on executives. 76 First, the Court stated that corporate officers
have a duty to implement procedures that will prevent violations of
environmental statutes. 77 Second, the Court required officers to
remedy existing violations.78 Moreover, the Court stated that fail-
69. 21 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
70. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281. Dotterweich was convicted on all counts, but
the company was acquitted. Id. at 278. He appealed on the grounds that he was
an individual and that he did not have knowledge of any wrongdoing. Id. at 281.
In rejecting his argument, the Supreme Court stated that "the historic conception
of a 'misdemeanor' makes all those responsible for it equally guilty." Id. The
Court held that because a corporation by its very nature acts through individuals,
and because Dotterweich was in such an influential position as president, he was
liable even if he was "otherwise innocent." Id.
71. Id. at 281.
72. Id. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
[b]alancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon
those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the
existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before
sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the inno-
cent people who are wholly helpless.
Id. at 285.
73. Id. at 284.
74. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
75. Id. at 673. In convicting ACME's president, the Court held that "Congress
has seen fit to enforce the accountability of responsible corporate agents dealing
with products which may affect the health of consumers by penal sanctions cast in
rigorous terms, and the obligations of the courts is to give them effect so long as
they do not violate the Constitution." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 672.
78. Id. The Park Court stated:
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ure to comply with either of these duties could possibly satisfy the
causation requirement for negligence, and hence, criminal liability
would attach. 79
Although courts have refined the RCO doctrine in relation to
environmental crimes, the doctrine continues to have severe ramifi-
cations.80 Under a strict liability environmental statute, a corporate
executive or officer is criminally liable for the corporation's actions,
regardless of knowledge or intent, if that officer "had, by reason of
his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either
to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so."81 It is clear that a "re-
sponsible" corporate officer with substantial corporate clout could
be prosecuted for violating environmental statutes without evidence
of criminal intent or knowledge of wrongdoing, as long as the rele-
vant statute so provides and circumstantial evidence shows that the
officer turned a blind eye to wrongful conduct.82
[t]he Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evi-
dence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility
and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to cor-
rect, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so.
Id. at 673-74.
79. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
80. See generally Jeremy D. Heep, Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doc-
trine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN. L.
REv. 699 (1994).
81. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74. See also United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512
(9th Cir. 1976) (convicting secretary-treasurer for violation of Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act because of duty of foresight and vigilance imposed on corporate
officers); United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230 (D.
Mass. 1980) (holding defendant could be guilty if found to have "responsible rela-
tionship" to violations of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). For a discussion of the
RCO doctrine under RCRA, see infra notes 106-21.
82. Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74. Initially, Park was found guilty on all counts, but
the Fourth Circuit reversed his conviction holding that due process required the
government to prove wrongful action on the part of the corporate officer. Id. at
666. In reversing, the Supreme Court held:
Thus, Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in provid-
ing sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who execute the cor-
porate mission-and this is by no means necessarily confined to a single
corporate agent or employee-the Act imposes not only a positive duty to
seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a
duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible cor-
porate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but
they are not more stringent that the public has a right to expect of those
who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises
whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public
that supports them.
Id. at 672.
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Consistent with courts' trend toward imposing corporate liabil-
ity, Congress explicitly incorporated the RCO doctrine into two en-
vironmental statutes.83  Specifically, Congress amended the
definition of the term "person," as defined in the penalty provisions
of the CWA8 and the CAA,85 to include the RCO doctrine defini-
tion. Thus, courts now have direct legislative authority for holding
CEOs and other corporate violators criminally liable for environ-
mental violations.
B. The Responsible Corporate Officer and the CWA
Under the CWA, a defendant need not specifically intend to
violate the law for a court to convict a corporate officer.86 Instead,
a court may convict a defendant who violates an environmental stat-
ute in a willful or negligent manner.87 In United States v. Frezzo Bros.,
Inc.,88 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found a president, secretary and corporation guilty on
six counts of willful or negligent discharge of pollutants in violation
of the CWA. 89 Applying the RCO doctrine, the court explained to
the jury that in order to convict, the jury need only find that: "1)
the defendants discharged a pollutant; 2) the defendants' dis-
charge of the pollutant was done willfully or negligently; [and] 3)
the defendants did not have a permit to discharge the pollutant."90
Consequently, the defendants in Frezzo Bros. were each fined
83. For a discussion of the CWA and CAA, see infra notes 86-105 & 122-33 and
accompanying text.
84. CWA § 309(c) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (3) (1994). This section states that
"[f]or purposes of this subsection, the term 'person' shall mean, in addition to the
definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate of-
ficer." Id. The general definitions provided in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) define the term
person as including "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State or any interstate
body." CWA § 501(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).
85. CAA § 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (1994). "For the purpose of this
subsection, the term 'person' includes, in addition to the entities referred to in
section 7602(e) of this title, any responsible corporate officer." Id. The general
definitions in 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1996) define the term "person" to include "an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political sub-
division of a State, and any agency, department or instrumentality of the United
States and any officer, agent, or employee thereof." Id.
86. United States v. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. 713, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1982). For a
discussion of the legislative history of the criminal provisions of CWA, see infra
notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
87. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. at 720.
88. 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
89. Id. at 714-15. The defendants' corporation was held responsible for al-
lowing run-off waste to be discharged into navigable waters. Id. at 714.
90. Id. at 722.
1997]
17
Bellew and Surtz: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A Corporate Guide to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
222 VIL.ANOvA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
$25,000 and sentenced to thirty days in prison, and the corporation
was fined $50,000.91 Thus, as early as 1980, the broad jury instruc-
tions utilized by courts92 and the stiff penalties imposed, sent a
message to corporations and their officers that the courts intended
to strictly enforce the criminal provisions of the various environ-
mental statutes at their disposal. 93
91. Id. at 715. The defendants' challenge to the convictions failed on appeal.
92. In Frezzo Bros., the lower court instructed the jury as follows:
Now, I want to point out to you that if you have found beyond a
reasonable doubt, in your consideration of this case, that the Govern-
ment has proved all of those three essential elements of the crime against
the corporation, or the corporate defendant; and if you, in the course of
your deliberation, found that the Government failed to prove each of
those three essential elements of the crime against one or both of these
individual defendants; if you find in addition, that the Government
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either or both of the individual
defendants was a responsible corporate officer and held a position of au-
thority in the operation of the business of the corporate defendant at the
time, on or about the time or times alleged in the indictment, then, of
course, you may find that responsible corporate officer guilty of the crime
committed by the corporation.
I In other words, this particular Act [CWA] specifically provided that
responsible corporate officers can be held criminally responsible for the
acts of their corporation.
Now, I want to say to you that not every corporate officer is a respon-
sible corporate officer, or one in a position of authority upon whom Con-
gress has placed the burden of vigilance and foresight. A "responsible
corporate officer," or one in a "position of authority" for these criminal
purposes, has been defined as one who has a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction or occupance which the statute forbids.
Another way of defining it is as follows: If the officer has the respon-
sibility and powers commensurate with that responsibility to devise
whatever measures are necessary to ensure compliance with the statute
and regulations, then that officer is a responsible corporate officer.
So what I am trying to say to you: That if you find the corporate
defendant, the corporation, was guilty of the crime charged in any one of
these counts, because of the acts or omissions of its agents; and if you also
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, for instance Guido,
had by virtue of his position in the corporation, the power to prevent or
correct the violation; and if you find that he failed to exercise that power
to prevent or correct the wrongdoing, then you may also find him guilty.
And by the same token, I want to say: If you found the corporate
defendant guilty of the crime charged in any count of this indictment
because of the acts or omissions of its agents; and if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, James L. Frezzo had by virtue of his
position in the corporation the power to prevent or correct the violation;
and if you find that he failed to exercise that power to prevent or correct
the wrongdoing, then you may also find him guilty. But you must take up
each one of their cases separately in this connection.
United States v. Frezzo Bros., Criminal No. 78-218, Charge Volume IVb 27-29, de-
cided in, 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Marathon Dev., Corp., 867 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.
1989). In Marathon the defendant bulldozed approximately five acres of federally-
protected wetlands. Id. at 97. For failing to obtain the proper wetland permits,
[Vol. VIII: p. 205
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The trend94 to criminally enforce the CWA by means of the
RCO doctrine was again illustrated eleven years later in United States
v. Brittain.95 The defendant in Brittain was a public utilities direc-
tor.96 The plant supervisor informed the defendant that the plant
was discharging raw sewage, and also that the supervisor had wit-
nessed two of the discharges.97 The terms of the plant's utilities
permit allowed discharges at only one point source, and the de-
fendant was required to report any discharges from other sources. 98
In violation of this duty, the defendant instructed the plant supervi-
sor not to report the discharges to EPA.99 The defendant argued
that he was not a "person" liable for criminal prosection within the
terms of the CWA because the government failed to prove that he
was a "responsible" corporate officer. 100 However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, and af-
firmed the conviction. 10'
Marathon and its senior vice president were each indicted on 25 counts of violat-
ing the CWA. Id. at 97-98. The defendants plead guilty, but specifically preserved
for appeal a defense that their activities were protected by a headwaters nationwide
permit. Id. at 98. Marathon's arguments were unsuccessful and the corporation
was fined $100,000. Id. More importantly, Marathon's senior vice president was
fined $10,000, and sentenced to a six-month suspended jail sentence and one year
of probation. Id.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir.
1991) (same); United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991) (describing the
jail sentences available under CWA); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir.
1989) (same); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 907 (1991) (same); United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States
v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990) (holding
director of public works department can be convicted under RCRA without gov-
ernment having established that he knew city did not obtain or possess permit to
dispose of hazardous waste); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510
(E.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing FIFRA and Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act); United States v. Alley, 755 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(describing prison sentences under CWA).
95. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 1415.
97. Id. at 1420.
98. Id. The City of Enid, Oklahoma, the holder of the wastewater permit, was
allowed to discharge pollutants from the city's wastewater treatment plant into a
nearby creek. Id. at 1417. The original permit allowed for discharges in two places,
but was later modified to allow only one point source. Id.
99. Id. at 1420.
100. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1418.
101. Id. at 1420. At the time of the offense the CWA prohibited the willful or
negligent discharge of a pollutant into waters of the United States and was punish-
able as a misdemeanor. CWA §§ 301(a), 309(c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)
(1984). The penalty was incarceration not to exceed one year, or a fine of not less
than $2,500 or more than $25,000 per day of violation, or both. In February 1987,
Congress amended subsection (c) (1) of the CWA and eliminated the term "willful"
while adding subsection (c) (2), which made a knowing violation of the Act a fel-
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Interestingly, although the government never presented the
RCO doctrine at trial, on appeal the Tenth Circuit analyzed the
RCO doctrine when determining whether the defendant was a "per-
son" liable under the CWA.102 In finding the defendant liable, the
court based its decision on the underlying rationale of the Dot-
terweich decision.103 In Dotterweich, the Supreme Court reasoned
that public health concerns outweighed the hardship suffered by a
criminally responsible corporate officer.104 The Brittain court's
conclusion suggests that a CEO or other responsible corporate ac-
tor does not have to be personally involved in a violation of the
CWA in order to be found criminally liable; rather, guilt may be
imputed based simply on one's corporate position.10 5
ony punishable by a period of incarceration of not more than three years, or a fine
of not less than $5,000 or more than $50,000 per day of violation, or both. CWA
§ 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). The defendant was also convicted on 18 counts of
falsely reporting a material fact to a government agency. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419.
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (punishment for making false statements).
102. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419. The court began by stating:
Section 1319(c) (3) does not define a "responsible corporate officer" and
the legislative history is silent regarding Congress's intention in adding
the term. The Supreme Court, however, first recognized the concept of
"responsible corporate officer" in 1943 (citations omitted). The Dot-
terweich Court held that a corporation's misdemeanor offense under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) was committed by
all corporate officers "who do have.., a responsible share in the further-
ance of the transaction which the statute outlaws ... though conscious-
ness of wrongdoing be totally wanting."
Id.
103. Id. (discussing the Dotterweich RCO doctrine analysis under the CWA).
For a full discussion of Dotterweich, see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
104. Id. The court stated:
[t]he rationale for this harsh rule lay in the type of legislative action that
the Dotterweich Court was interpreting. Congress passed the FDCA in or-
der to protect the public health, and, according to the Court, Congress
perceived the public health interest to outweigh the hardship suffered by
criminally liable responsible corporate officers who had no consciousness
of wrong-doing(citations omitted). The same rationale applies to the
Clean Water Act. Congress intended, with the Act, "to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters
... [and that] the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985."
Id. (second omission in original).
105. SeeJoseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, Criminal Enforcement of Environ-
mental LAW: The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine-Can You Go To Jail for What
You Don't Know?, 1992 Envt'l Law 1347, 1354 (1992) (discussing the availability of
conviction based on officer's position).
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C. Corporate Liability Under RCRA
Courts have also extended criminal liability to corporate of-
ficers for RCRA violations.106 In United States v. MacDonald & Wat-
son Waste Oil Co.,' 0 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit clarified the constitutional issue implicated by the RCO doc-
trine.108 Specifically, the court confronted the question of whether
removal of the mens rea requirement for criminal prosecution of
corporate officers comports with the United States Constitution. 10 9
The court stated that, although the RCO doctrine includes corpo-
rate actors in the definition of "person," it does not eliminate the
requirement of knowledge in a criminal prosecution.110 The First
Circuit stated that the original jury instructions were improper be-
106. Ornsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 6, at 10,102-03.
107. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
108. Id. In Madgonald, the company, its president and owner and two em-
ployees were convicted under RCRA § 3008(d) (1) for knowingly transporting and
causing the transportation of hazardous waste, toluene and soil contaminated with
toluene, to a facility without a permit. Id. at 39.
109. Id. The First Circuit reversed the lower court's decision because the fol-
lowing jury instructions allowed the jury to convict with a simple finding of negli-
gence rather than actual knowledge:
[w] an individual Defendant is also a corporate officer, the Govern-
ment may prove that individual's knowledge in either of two ways. The
first way is to demonstrate that the Defendant had actual knowledge of
the act in question. The second way is to establish that the defendant was
what is called a responsible corporate officer of the corporation commit-
ting the act. In order to prove that a person is a responsible corporate
officer three things must be shown.
First, it must be shown that the person is an officer of the corpora-
tion, not merely an employee.
Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility
for the activities that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or
even the president of a corporation is not enough. The Government
must prove that the person had a responsibility to supervise the activities
in question.
And the third requirement is that the officer must have known or
believed that the illegal activity of the type alleged occurred.
Id. at 50-51.
110. Id. at 55. The court specifically held:
[w]e agree with the decisions discussed above that knowledge may be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence, including position and responsibil-
ity of defendants such as corporate officers, as well as information
provided to those defendants on prior occasions. Further, willful blind-
ness to the facts constituting the offense may be sufficient to establish
knowledge. However, the district court erred by instructing the jury that
proof that a defendant was a responsible corporate officer, as described,
would suffice to conclusively establish the element of knowledge ex-
pressly required under § 3008(d) (1). Simply because a responsible cor-
porate officer believed that on a prior occasion illegal transactions
occurred, he did not necessarily possess knowledge of the violation
charged. In a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere
showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an ade-
19971 225
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cause they allowed the jury to conclusively presume knowledge based
on circumstantial evidence.11 Thus, under MacDonald, knowledge
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence coupled with a per-
son's corporate position and responsibility, but a jury is not obli-
gated to reach that conclusion.112 The holding in MacDonald,
therefore, places a limitation on the RCO doctrine because a per-
son's corporate position alone is not sufficient to satisfy the knowl-
edge requirement of a criminal prosecution." 3
The decision in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.114 also
addressed the use of the RCO doctrine when enforcing the crimi-
nal provisions of RCRA.'1 5 In Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit
held that corporate employees, in addition to CEOs, may be prose-
cuted under the RCO doctrine.116 In Johnson & Towers, the defend-
ants were charged with violations of RCRA after the company
pumped waste chemicals from its cleaning operations into a
trench.11 7 The defendants, a foreman and the service manager of
the company's trucking department, argued that they were not
quate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge (footnote
omitted).
Id.
111. Id. at 54-55. The court analyzed the "willful blindness" doctrine in rela-
tion to the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Id. at 52-55. See also United
States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 796 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998
(1976) (allowingjury verdict to stand which used "conscious avoidance" in place of
"knowledge"). See also 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BtLcKmRx, FEDERAL JURY PRAcTICE AND
INSTRUcTIONS § 14.09 (3d ed. 1977) which provides:
[t]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would other-
wise have been obvious to him. A finding beyond reasonable doubt of a
conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of
knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may
be inferred from willful blindness to the existence of the fact.
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing
of the eyes, and the inferences to be drawn from any such evidence. A
showing of negligence or mistake is not sufficient to support a finding of
willfulness or knowledge.
Id.
112. MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55. Had the instructions told the jury that corpo-
rate status could suffice as evidence of knowledge, as opposed to the instructions
that the corporate status "would" suffice as evidence, then the lower court would
not have erred. Id.
113. Id.
114. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Angel v. United States, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985).
115. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the criminal provisions of
the RCRA, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
116. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65.
117. Id. at 664.
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"owners and operators" under RCRA. 118 The court, however, con-
cluded that knowledge of permit requirements may be imputed to
individuals who hold responsible corporate positions within a de-
fendant company.1 19 Although some courts have declined to follow
the holding in Johnson & Towers,' 20 the decision nevertheless broad-
ens criminal liability to include responsible corporate officers as
well as CEOs. 121
D. The Responsible Corporate Officer and the CAA
The CAA also allows for criminal prosecutions through appli-
cation of the RCO doctrine. 12 2 Under the CAA, criminal sanctions
apply to the following acts: (1) violating any requirements of state
implemented schemes; (2) violating, failing or refusing to comply
with any order under certain sections of the CAA; (3) violating new
source performance standards; and (4) violating emission stan-
dards.1 23 Like the CWA and RCRA, enforcement of the CAA en-
sures that responsible corporate officers pay for the consequences
of their irresponsible actions.
For example, in United States v. DAR Construction, Inc.,' 24 the
Second Circuit found a foreman and his contracting firm guilty of
violating asbestos removal and handling regulations.' 25 Conse-
quently, the court sentenced the foreman to 90 days in prison and
three years of probation.1 26 In DAR, the foreman had ordered
workers to conceal asbestos waste; thus, the question of corporate
118. Id. at 664-65.
119. Id. at 670. The court held that Section 6928(d) (2) (A) of RCRA "covers
employees as well as owners and operators of the facility who knowingly treat, store
or dispose of any hazardous waste . . ." Id.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1991) (declining to follow Johnson & Towers to extent that it would require actual
knowledge of RCRA's regulations for defendant to be guilty of RCRA violation);
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083
(1990) (affirming conviction on different grounds than RCO doctrine).
121. See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 662.
122. For a discussion of the legislative history of the criminal provisions of the
CAA, see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
123. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1) (1994).
124. Foreman On New York Troject, Contractor Sentenced For Clean Air Act NESHAP
Offenses, 20 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 21 (May 5, 1989) (citing United States v. DAR Con-
str. Co., 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1989)).
125. Id. The defendants removed dry asbestos from building pipes and
dropped it 25 feet to the ground, resulting in the release of hazardous amounts of
asbestos. Id. DAR Construction pled guilty to three violations and was ordered to
pay fines in excess of $50,000. Id.
126. Id.
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liability was not debated. 127 The DAR court's severe prison sen-
tence and hefty fines reinforces the fact that responsible corporate
officers will serve prison time for their environmental crimes.128
Furthermore, in United States v. Import Certification Laboratories,
Inc.,12 9 the United States District Court for the Central District of
California sentenced the president of the company and several em-
ployees to prison terms and probation for submitting false re-
ports.'3 0 These reports certified that imported vehicles, which the
company tested, met air pollution laws.13' Similarly, in United States
v. Custom Engineering, Inc.,13 2 the president received a six month jail
sentence with five years probation for reporting false testing results,
with the company receiving a similar probationary sentence. l33
These two cases further emphasize courts' trend toward strictly en-
forcing criminal provisions in environmental statutes.
IV. A CORPORATE GUIDE TO AVOIDING LIABILITY
Avoiding, or at least limiting the extent of corporate and indi-
vidual liability, for environmental compliance violations, is truly in
the hands of American businesspersons.134 EPA sets forth basic in-
centives for self-policing and self-auditing, which in turn provide
protection for corporations that follow the EPA guidelines. 135 At
127. Id. Similarly, a corporation and four of its managers pled guilty to con-
spiracy to violate the CAA asbestos standards in United States v. Cuyohoga Wreck-
ing Co., Officials Of Cuyahoga Wrecking Co. Convicted in New York, Los Angeles Cases, 19
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1289 (Nov. 4, 1988) (citing United States v. Schwab, No. 87-
1483M (E.D.N.Y. 1988)) (convicting president of corporation for bribing EPA offi-
cial in charge of monitoring asbestos abatement projects; defendant faced possible
sentence of thirty years).
128. Forman On New York Project, Contractor Sentenced For Clean Air Act NESHAP
Offenses, 20 ENV'T RE'. (BNA) at 21 (citing DAR 888 F.2d 126).
129. Enforcement: Auto Shop Owner Fined $37.8 Million for Leaking Oil Into Drink-
ing Water Source, 18 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1993 (Jan. 8, 1988) (citing United States v.
Import Certification Lab., Inc., C.D. Cal., No. CR 87-249 AWT).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Enforcement: EPA Seeks $5.1 Million in Penalties For Allegedly High Lead Con-
tent in Fuel, 18 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 465 (May 29, 1987) (citing United States v. Cus-
tom Engineering, Inc., No. Cr. 86-0051301 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
133. Id.
134. For a discussion of EPA compliance guidelines that corporate leaders
need to institute, see infra notes 135-64 and accompanying text.
135. 60 Fed. Reg. 66706 (1996). The most current policy statement by EPA
on self-policing became effective on January 22, 1996 and is entitled "Incentives for
Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations." Id.
The summary of the statement is as follows:
[tjhe Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] today issues its final policy
to enhance protection of human health and the environment by encour-
aging regulated entities to voluntarily discover, and disclose and correct
24
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the core of EPA's guidelines are simple rules of disclosure, honesty,
diligence and responsibility.13 6 Although these guidelines do not
completely insulate a corporate officer from criminal liability, com-
pliance generally forecloses the possibility that EPA will recom-
mend an officer for criminal prosecution.13 7
The new EPA policy is basically a three-part guidance incen-
tive.138 First, if companies or public agencies voluntarily conduct
environmental audits or self-evaluations according to the policy's
seven basic "conditions,"1 39 EPA pledges not to seek gravity-based,
violations of environmental requirement. Incentives include eliminating
or substantially reducing the gravity component of civil penalties and not
recommending cases for criminal prosecution where specified conditions
are met, to those who voluntarily self-disclose and promptly correct viola-
tions. The policy also restates EPA's long-standing practice of not re-
questing voluntary audit reports to trigger enforcement investigations.
This policy was developed in close consultation with the U.S. Department
of Justice, states, public interest groups and the regulated community,
and will be applied uniformly by the Agency's enforcement programs.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. In the "Explanation of Policy" section EPA explains that:
[w]here violations are found through voluntary environmental audits or
efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due diligence, and are promptly
disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA will not seek gravity-based
(i.e., non-economic benefit) penalties and will generally not recommend
criminal prosecution against the regulated entity .. . The policy includes
important safeguards to deter irresponsible behavior and protect the public and
environment. For example, in addition to prompt disclosure and expedi-
tious correction, the policy requires companies to act to prevent recur-
rence of the violation and to remedy any environmental harm which may
have occurred. Repeated violations or those which result in actual harm or may
present imminent and substantial endangerment are not eligible for relief under
this policy, and companies will not be allowed to gain an economic advan-
tage over their competitors by delaying their investment in compliance.
Corporations remain criminally liable for violations that result from conscious dis-
regard of their obligations under the law, and individuals are liable for criminal
misconduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. John J. Zodrow, EPA's 'Mitigated Enforcement' Policy, 10 WTR. NAT. RE-
SOURcES J. 3, 60 (1996).
139. Id. Zodrow consolidated the policy into seven primary conditions:
(1) [t] he entity discovers the violation through a voluntary environmen-
tal audit or self-evaluation appropriate to the size and nature of the
regulated entity;
(2) [v]iolations discovered through self-policing are fully and immedi-
ately disclosed to all appropriate agencies. Voluntary disclosure must
occur prior to the commencement of an agency investigation, citizen
suit, third-party complaint or the entity's knowledge that such action
by a regulatory agency or third party was imminent;
(3) [t]he regulated entity corrects the violation either within sixty days of
discovering the violation or, if more time is needed, as expeditiously
as possible;
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punitive penalties. 140 Second, EPA will not recommend criminal
prosecution for companies that act in "good faith" by identifying,
disclosing and correcting violations, "as long as no serious harm has
occurred."14' Third, EPA will continue to refrain "from routine re-
quests for environmental audit reports," both civil and criminal, if
corporations demonstrate systematic compliance. 142
Essentially, the new EPA policy encourages compliance by of-
fering incentives rather than imposing sanctions for violations. 143
In a recent 1995 survey conducted by Price-Waterhouse, more than
90% of the corporations engaged in self-auditing stated that one "of
the reasons they [audited] was to find and correct violations before
they were found by government inspectors." 44 Moreover, if a cor-
poration voluntarily discloses violations discovered through audits
prior to a governmental investigation, the new EPA policy advocates
discretion and leniency in criminal prosecution. 145
(4) [t] he entity expeditiously remedies any condition that creates an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment;
(5) [t]he entity implements appropriate measures to remedy any envi-
ronmental harm due to the violation and to prevent a recurrence of
the violation;
(6) [tlhe entity has not failed to take appropriate steps to avoid repeat
violations;
(7) [tjhe entity cooperates and provides information required by EPA, to
include providing requested documents, access to employees and
assistance in further investigation into the violations.
Id. at 61.
140. 60 Fed Reg. 66706 (1996). EPA will also reduce gravity-based penalties
by 75% for violations that are voluntarily discovered, despite a company's failure to
meet all seven required conditions. Id.
141. Zodrow, supra note 138, at 65.
142. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66707. "EPA has refrained from making routine requests
for audit reports since issuance of its 1986 policy on environmental auditing." Id.
143. Id. at 66706-07. The purpose of the policy is described as follows:
[t]his policy is designed to encourage greater compliance with laws and
regulations that protect human health and the environment. It promotes
a higher standard of self-policing by waiving gravity-based penalties for
violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected, and which were dis-
covered through voluntary audits or compliance management systems
that demonstrate due diligence . . . EPA's enforcement program pro-
vides a strong incentive for responsible behavior by imposing stiff sanc-
tions for noncompliance.
Id.
144. Id. at 66707. Interestingly, more than half of the same corporations said
"they would expand environmental auditing in exchange for reduced penalties for
violations discovered and corrected." Id.
145. Id. Specifically, EPA has stated that it "never recommended criminal
prosecution of a regulated entity based on voluntary disclosure of violations discov-
ered through audits and disclosed to the government before an investigation was
already under way." Id.
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Most importantly, good faith is a requisite aspect of the new
EPA policy.146 Basically, under the RCO doctrine, willful blindness
or knowing violations of environmental regulations are not to be
protected under the new compliance incentives. 47 Furthermore,
the new EPA policy does not apply when corporations cause serious
actual harm to human health or the environment. 148 Thus, EPA
may still prosecute culpable individuals that disregard or turn a
blind eye to their corporate compliance responsibility. 149
CEOs and their corporations need to recognize the wise invest-
ment of a self-policing, self-auditing environmental program for
two simple reasons. First, EPA will severely punish those companies
that fail to follow the established guidelines. °50 This outcome will
undoubtedly prove to be much more costly to corporations than
installing internal safeguards.15' Second, case law suggests that
courts will not hesitate to enforce criminal penalties. 152 In short,
CEOs need to implement EPA's straightforward guidelines, which
include the following: (1) systematic discovery of violations; 55
146. Id. Under section I(D) (3) the EPA states: "This policy is limited to good
actors, and therefore has important limitations." Id.
147. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66707. The policy will not apply "where corporate offi-
cials are consciously involved in or willfully blind to violations, or conceal or con-
done noncompliance." Id.
148. Id.
149. See Zodrow, supra note 138, at 61. Zodrow explains that:
EPA will not recommend to DOJ that criminal charges be brought against
a regulated entity meeting all seven conditions so long as the violation
does not encompass a corporate management philosophy that condones
environmental violations, high-level corporate officials' involvement in or
willful blindness to the environment. This policy does not apply to crimi-
nal acts of individual employees as EPA reserves the right to prosecute
any individual for criminal misconduct, even though EPA does not pro-
ceed against the corporation.
Id.
150. For a discussion of decisions which demonstrate strict enforcement of
EPA standards and criminal provisions, see supra notes 86-133 and accompanying
text.
151. See Harig, supra note 62, at 146-150 (discussing high penalties and settle-
ment costs for criminal enforcement cases). Therefore, self-regulation is economi-
cally sound. Id. at 156-57.
152. For a discussion of strictjudicial enforcement, see supra notes 86-133 and
accompanying text.
153. 60 Fed. Reg. 66707, 66711 (1996). Systematic discovery is defined as:
(a) an environmental audit; or (b) an objective, documented, systematic
procedure or practice reflecting the regulated entity's due diligence in
preventing, detecting, and correcting violations. The regulated entity
must provide accurate and complete documentation to the Agency as to
how it exercises due diligence to prevent, detect and correct violations
according to the criteria for due diligence outlined in Section B. EPA
may require as a condition of penalty mitigation that a description of the
regulated entity's due diligence efforts be made publicly available.
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(2) voluntary disclosure;M (3) prompt disclosure;1 5 5 (4) discovery
of disclosure independent of the government or third party plain-
tiffs;1 5 6 (5) correction and remediation measures; 15 7 (6) prevention
Id.
154. Id. The violation must be identified voluntarily, not by an already estab-
lished EPA requirement "regulation, permit, judicial or administrative order, or
consent agreement." Id. This voluntary disclosure policy does not apply to:
(a) emissions violations detected through a continuous emissions moni-
tor (or alternative monitor established in a permit) where any such moni-
toring is required;
(b) violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) discharge limits detected through required sampling or moni-
toring; nor
(c) violations discovered through a compliance audit required to be per-
formed by the terms of a consent order or settlement agreement.
Id.
155. Id. Prompt disclosure occurs when "[t] he regulated entity fully discloses
a specific violation within 10 days (or such shorter period provided by law) after it
has discovered that the violation has occurred, or may have occurred, in writing to
EPA." Id.
156. Id. The violation must also be identified and disclosed by the regulated
entity prior to:
(a) the commencement of a federal, state or local agency inspection or
investigation, or the issuance by such agency of an information request to
the regulated entity;
(b) notice of a citizen suit;
(c) the filing of a complaint by a third party;
(d) the reporting of the violation to EPA (or other government agency)
by a "whistleblower" employee, rather than by one authorized to speak on
behalf of the regulated entity;, or
(e) imminent discovery of the violation by a regulatory agency.
Id.
157. Id. at 66711. Corrective and remedial measures are defined as when:
[t]he regulated entity corrects the violation within 60 days, certifies in
writing that violations have been corrected, and takes appropriate meas-
ures as determined by EPA to remedy any environmental or human harm
due to the violation. If more than 60 days will be needed to correct the
violation(s), the regulated entity must so notify EPA in writing before the
60-day period has passed. Where appropriate, EPA may require that to
satisfy conditions 5 and 6, a regulated entity enter into a publicly available
written agreement, administrative consent order or judicial consent de-
cree, particularly where compliance or remedial measures are complex
or a lengthy schedule for attaining and maintaining compliance or
remediation harm is required.
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of recurrence; 158 (7) no repeat violations;159 and (7) coop-
eration.160
EPA stands firm in its commitment to protect the environ-
ment. Nevertheless, a real and accessible solution for avoiding
criminal liability exists.161 Although compliance with the new EPA
self-policing policy is not necessarily a "Get Out ofJail Free Card," it
will certainly eliminate a substantial degree of potential expo-
sure. 162 Investing in a detailed, systematic and thorough internal
audit system today, coupled with corporate responsibility, will pro-
tect the corporation, corporate management and, most impor-
tantly, the environment. 163 EPA is not on a corporate witch hunt,
rather, it has developed a policy designed to "enhance protection
of human health and the environment by encouraging" businesses
to "voluntarily discover, disclose, correct and prevent violations" of
EPA regulations. 164
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: GOOD BUSINESS AND
COMMON SENSE
The purpose of this Comment is to alert CEOs and their corpo-
rations of the legitimate need to comply with EPA's new self-polic-
158. 60 Fed. Reg. at 66711. "The regulated entity agrees in writing to take
steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, which may include improvement to
its environmental auditing or due diligence efforts." Id.
159. 1& The specific violation cannot have occurred within the past three
years and cannot be a part of a pattern of "federal, state or local violations by the
facility's parent organization (if any), which have occurred within the past five
years." Id. EPA defines a violation under this section as:
(a) any violation of federal, state or local environmental law identified in
a judicial or administrative order, consent agreement or order, com-
plaint, or notice of violation, conviction or plea agreement; or
(b) any act or omission for which the regulated entity has previously re-
ceived penalty mitigation from EPA or a state or local agency.
Id.
160. Id. A corporation must cooperate with EPA and provide any necessary
information that EPA requests in order to determine the applicability of this new
policy. Id. at 66712. "Cooperation includes, at a minimum, providing all re-
quested documents and access to employees and assistance in investigating the
violation, any noncompliance problems related to the disclosure, and any environ-
mental consequences related to the violations." Id.
161. For a discussion of the corporate guide to avoiding criminal liability, see
supra notes 134-60 and accompanying text, infra notes 161-64 and accompanying
text.
162. For a discussion of the steps a corporation needs to take to comply with
EPA guidelines, see supra notes 134-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Hodson, supra note 1, at 145-46 (discussing society's strong desire to
punish corporate offenders in effort to protect future generations).
164. 60 Fed. Reg. 66706, 66710 (1996).
1997]
29
Bellew and Surtz: Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A Corporate Guide to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
234 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRAL [Vol. VIII: p. 205
ing policy.' 65 However, there are other practical considerations
that should prompt responsible corporate officers to rethink their
outlook on the corporation's role and its effect on the environ-
ment. For example, when a CEO is imprisoned for an environmen-
tal violation that could have been easily avoided, the incarceration
can lead to the demise of the corporation. As a consequence, inno-
cent employees could lose theirjobs.166 Moreover, the effect of the
closing of a company in a small town can be economically devastat-
ing. Finally, criminal enforcement is often coupled with heavy fines
which in turn must be passed on to the consumer.1 67 Higher costs
for goods hurts everyone, including CEOs.
Responsible corporate actors must implement comprehensive
self-policing and self-auditing plans. 168 Corporations should hire
an environmental specialist, preferably a former EPA employee,
who is familiar with the EPA guidelines and the importance of ad-
hering to them. 169 Alternatively, the corporation could hire an en-
vironmental team to spearhead the corporation's compliance
effort.170 Ideally, an environmental team, acting as the corpora-
tion's liaison with EPA, could approve disclosure of corporate infor-
mation and strictly monitor the corporation's compliance.' 7 '
Education is another simple and practical method for avoiding
criminal liability. 172 Not only should CEOs be educated, but they
165. Kirk F. Marty, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance: Legis-
lative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REv. 495, 515
(1995).
166. See generally, Mia Ann Mazza, The New Evidentiary Privilegefor Environmental
Audit Reports: Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 85 (1996)
(stating "audit condusions can set off a chain of reporting violations" which have
detrimental effect on business productivity and in turn on sustainability of corpo-
rate workforce).
167. Stephen D. Brown & Alison M. Benders, How to Handle a Complex Crimi-
nal Environmental Case, 1 V.L. EN rL. L.J. 149 (1990).
168. For a discussion of these schemes, see supra notes 134-67 and accompa-
nying text.
169. See James T. Banks, Corporate Environmental Compliance Programs: Are We
Seeing an Evolution in Federal Policy ? C964 ALI-ABA 467, 482 (1994) (describing
one company's use of "internal hot line" and environmental specialist through
which employees can foster compliance).
170. Id.
171. Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wickins, Environmental Audits and Enforce-
ment Policy, 16 HAxv. Emrw. L. REv. 365, 410 (1992) (analogizing possible self-
policing scheme to one in operation at Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) which is permissible for "companies that have implemented sound
internal management programs").
172. See Banks, supra note 169, at 482; see also Kenneth A. Hodson &James D.
Vieregg, Environmental Crime Now Means Prison Time, 29 DEC. ARuz. Ar'y 22, 23
(1992) (stating current or former employees may be first line of communication to
investigative agencies about violations of environmental laws).
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should also distribute information to all employees which empha-
sizes the importance of protecting the environment as well as the
severe ramifications for failing to comply with EPA's standards.173
Corporations should also seek legal advice when implementing
such programs, because environmental lawyers are knowledgeable
of the various statutes with which corporations must comply and
the steps necessary for compliance with those statutes.174
In conclusion, compliance with EPA's new guidelines, in addi-
tion to an awareness and education in the harsh reality of failing to
meet these guidelines, provide the basis for sound business in our
new environmentally conscious world. These three factors, coupled
with honesty, integrity and cooperation, while not completely insu-
lating a CEO from criminal liability, will certainly decrease the like-
lihood of criminal prosecution.
Sean j Bellew
Daniel T. Surtz
173. Id.
174. See id. at 482 (discussing teaming of environmental specialists with law-
yers to ensure compliance network).
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